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Abstract: The United States may be facing its greatest
economic crisis since the Great Depression.
Understandably, society wants to learn from this crisis to
ensure that the United States will not repeat the same
mistakes that lead to the current situation. Obtaining the
answers undoubtedly starts with research. But, what if the
researcher's methods tread on financial privacy? Society will
have solved one problem only to create another. In this note,
I use three steps to show that financial research can be
expanded without subtracting from financial privacy. First, I
assert that current financial privacy regulations have
unnecessarily burdened and impeded academic research. To
reach this assertion I use a real world example of researchers
studying the mortgage meltdown. Second, I demonstrate
that it is possible to uphold financial privacy rights and
advance research. I do this by examining research and
privacy in other contexts, specifically the HIPAA research
exception. Finally, by learning from HIPAA and by utilizing
current data collection mechanisms already in place, I
suggest there are policy approaches to allow for both a high
level of financial privacy and access to valuable data.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an economic downturn, there is a tendency to explain the
causes and potential implications of the financial crisis. This research
is important as it could lead to a better understanding of what went
wrong, and therefore provide policy suggestions to avoid another
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crisis. However, this research is time consuming and often lacks data
because of certain regulatory barriers that limit researchers' access to
data.
This note documents the difficulty in gathering financial mortgage
data. Part II examines the National Consumer Law Center's attempt
to gather financial data, showing that there is a gap in the market
between data that needs to be gathered and data that is available. Part
III looks at the current regulatory framework and databases in place
that researchers use to gather financial data. Part IV examines the
Health Insurance and Portability Assurance Act ("HIPPA"), and uses
the Act as an example of a research exception to regulatory
requirements. Finally, the note focuses on potential policy options
that would both protect financial privacy and expand the data that is
realistically available to the researcher.
II. FINANCIAL DATA COLLECTION IN PRACTICE
The National Consumer Law Center ("NCLC") advocates for
consumer protection laws on behalf of low income and vulnerable
individuals.1 The NCLC monitors mortgages and foreclosures in poor
neighborhoods and cities. Specifically, the NCLC is determined to
curb predatory lending, which "disproportionately affects minority
homeowners and communities."2
To examine the issues surrounding mortgages in low-income
areas, the NCLC has attempted to gather mortgage data in order to
better illustrate and document the adverse effects of predatory
lending. From 2006 to 2009, the NCLC gathered home data from
roughly three thousand mortgages in the hopes of creating a dynamic
and extensive data bank. The NCLC maintains a project called the
National Mortgage Data Repository ("NMDR") and expects the
NMDR to be the authoritative source on predatory lending and sub-
prime loan terms. 3
While the goals of the NMDR are laudable, this note is concerned
with how the NCLC gathers the data necessary to complete the
I National Consumer Law Center, About Us,
http://www.consumerlaw.org/about/index.shtml (last visited April 8, 2010).
2 National Consumer Law Center, Predatory Mortgage Lending,
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/predatory-mortgage/index.shtml (last visited April
8, 2010).
3 National Consumer Law Center, National Mortgage Data Repository,
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/repository/index.shtml (last visited April 8, 2010).
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NMDR. This note will use the NCLC as a case study to illustrate the
regulatory framework associated with financial research. To
understand and determine how the NCLC obtains its data, I
interviewed Elizabeth Renuart, an attorney working in the NCLC
Boston office.4
According to Ms. Renuart, the NCLC wanted to analyze mortgage
information by zip code. The majority of the data gathered
independently by the NCLC came from attorneys who represented
consumers in predatory lending class actions or related suits. With
their clients' consent, attorneys would redact information and provide
it to the NCLC. Other sources of data include housing councils, state
attorney generals, and consumers themselves. Notably absent from
the source list are the financial institutions that issue the loans,
because certain regulations restrict them from releasing financial
mortgage data.
In addition to the direct gathering of data, the NCLC may also rely
on data gathered under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
("HDMA"). This database provides a wide range of information with a
specific focus on monitoring low-income lending patterns. This
information is then combined with the directly gathered information,
and, if enough data can be obtained, the NCLC will have a
comprehensive database.
In over three years of gathering data, the NCLC was only able to
collect roughly 3,000 mortgage applications out of the hundreds of
thousands in existence. This figure is low considering that the NCLC
has multiple researchers working on the project, and while their
budget is not immense, it is likely larger than a single academic
working on a project. This low figure indicates that there could
possibly be a policy problem that is stymieing research, and without
financial institution cooperation, the NCLC is restricted in what it can
reliably retrieve. Using the NCLC example as a backdrop, this note
examines the financial data regulations and the financial privacy
restrictions in place to protect consumers and tries to determine if
policy changes could aid research. This note concludes that the
regulations in place are weighted too much in favor of financial
privacy and unnecessarily burden legitimate research.
4 Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Renuart, Attorney, National Consumer Law Center
(Mar. 11, 2009) (No longer with the NCLC, Miss Renuart is currently an assistant professor of
law at Albany Law School).
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III. COLLECTING FINANCIAL DATA
This section will detail financial data collection and the
impediments researchers face in gathering data. The first part will
examine what data is publicly available to researchers under the
current regulatory framework and the potential problems with this
publicly available data. Then, having examined how data is gathered
through public databases, the second part will examine how
researchers can gather data privately and the subsequent regulatory
barriers that can limit collection of data.
When researching financial data, the researcher would first
consult the publicly available HMDA data, and then if unsuccessful,
the researcher may privately collect the data. Private data collection
could involve using a private company if the researcher has funds,
going directly to the institutions and asking for the data, or contacting
other sources such as plaintiffs' lawyers or individual homeowners.
A. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA
The government collects a large amount and a wide range of
mortgage data. In 1975 Congress enacted the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act to combat the perceived lack of lending to less
fortunate geographic areas.5 By accumulating data, Congress can
monitor trends and determine if lenders are unfairly under-serving
certain areas. 6 Specifically, Congress wanted to ensure that minorities
were not being denied access to loans.7 These priorities are set out in
Regulation C and largely determine how the government proceeds in
collection data.
In the HMDA, Congress gave The Federal Reserve Board of
Governors the authority to issue regulations concerning what data
lenders must report to the federal government. Regulation C contains
the guidelines. 8 Under Regulation C, the lender is required to submit
a loan application register ("LAR") once a year, and for each loan
application include: (a) the loan type and amount, (b) the property,
5 12 U.S.C. § 28o1(a) (2006).
6 Id. at § 28o1(b).
7 Alicia H. Munnell, Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne & James McEneaney,
Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996).
8 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(a) (2009).
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such as location and type, (c) the disposition of the application, denied
or approved, and (d) the applicant's ethnicity, race, sex, and income9
The information is then compiled by the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC") and released to the public
in an aggregate form by institution, county, or metropolitan statistical
area.10 While the data is rich, and getting richer after Regulation C11
was implemented in 2004, it is not sufficiently broad to allow for a
wide range of economic studies.
B. INDIVIDUAL AND PRIVATE RESEARCH EFFORTS
While the LARs can provide a wide range of data, they do not
provide every piece of information that researchers need. While this
note does not specifically address what data researchers would want,
it is assumed researchers would like to gather more individualized and
specific data not found in LARs. Essentially research is necessarily
bounded by whatever is in the LARs, and this reduces the range of
studies and data collection that can be completed. Moreover,
researchers cannot collect data from the largest holder of financial
data: financial institutions. As a practical matter the banks control the
data and, due to privacy laws, cannot release the data, even to a well-
intentioned researcher. Further, the banks view mortgage
information as proprietary and even without privacy laws would be
unlikely to part with the data. Therefore, the most direct method a
researcher can employ is to directly contact individual mortgage
holders and attempt to gather information that way.
Financial institutions can use the privacy restrictions enacted in
the Gramm Leach Bliley Act as a reason to deny information.
Congress passed the Gramm Leach Bliley Act ("GLB") in 1999, "[t]o
enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a
prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms,
insurance companies, and other financial service providers."12 The
9 FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO HDMA REPORTING, GETTING
IT RIGHT! p. 8 (June 2008), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/2oo8guide.pdf.
10 See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Reports,
http://www.ffiec.gov/reports.htm.
11 For more information about regulation C., see FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION
COUNCIL REGULATION C-HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE (2004), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/regulationc2oo4.pdf.
12 Pub. L. No. lO6-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999).
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Act created strict and precise financial privacy regulations, and placed
rulemaking authority with a number of federal regulatory bodies.13
The GLB Act requires "financial institutions" to adequately
safeguard the nonpublic information of their customers. 14 "Financial
institutions" is an inclusive term, and if an institution engages in
commercial and consumer lending, it is almost certainly a financial
institution, and thus under the purview of the GLB Act.15
Additionally, the GLB Act distinguishes between customers and
consumers. A consumer has a one-time relationship with the financial
institution, whereas a customer is a consumer who has repeated long-
term business transactions with the institution.16 A mortgage qualifies
the consumer as a customer, and the mortgagee is therefore governed
by the financial privacy protections of the GLB Act.17
As a customer of a financial institution, the mortgage holder must
first be directly provided a privacy notice, which details the
institution's general privacy policies.' 8  This notice informs the
customer of the manner in which the institution will use the
customer's non-public information. 19 If the institution plans to
distribute non-public information to non-affiliated third parties (i.e.
researchers), the customer must be provided with express notice of
the disclosure2o and the opportunity to opt-out of the disclosure.21
A number of exceptions allow financial institutions the ability to
disclose non-public information without facing repercussions. The
Act applies only to "non-public" information, not to information that
is available through public records such as mortgage data that is
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 68Ol-O9; 15 U.S.C. § 68o4(a)(1); See Peter Swire, The Surprising Virtues of
the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1263 (2002).
14 15 U.S.C. § 68o1(a)(20o6).
15 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A)(2oo6).
16 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IN BRIEF: THE FINANCIAL PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS OF THE
GRAMM LEACH BLILEY ACr (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/idtheft/bus53.pdf.
17 Id.
18 15 U.S.C. § 68o3(a)(2oo6).
19 Id.
20 Id. at § 68o2(b)(1)(A)(2oo6).
21Id. at § 6802(b)(1)(B)(20O6).
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included in tax records.22 Also, the customer has no opt-out provision
for certain types of data such as data collected by regulatory agencies
within their powers.23
However, there is no research exception. If the financial
institution agrees to provide information, it must first notify
customers and allow them to opt out. The costs associated with
notification, mainly postage fees, are a disincentive for companies to
agree to the research, and even if the company agrees to disclose
information, potential subjects may opt out.2 4  Therefore, by
conveniently claiming GLB Act compliance costs, an institution can
deny information requests.
Because researchers cannot use the institutions, they must gather
any information not contained in the LARs from individual
homeowners or other people who are permitted to release the
information on their behalf. This includes obtaining information from
attorneys who represent homeowners in class action suits or attorney
generals who are filing suits against lenders. While this direct method
of gathering data can produce results, the researcher is not likely to be
able to gather a broad and comprehensive group of data. A researcher
wishing to explore a new area of research or a new line of data
indicators will be hard pressed to gather a large sample size because, if
HMDA does not have the necessary data, the researcher must then
devote his energy to data collection, which may or may not actually
produce results.
IV. THE HEALTH INSURANCE AND PORTABILITY ASSURANCE ACT
When discussing financial research, it can be helpful to analyze
research in other academic fields. Medical research is similar to
financial research in that gathering data often conflicts with personal
privacy concerns. However, in the medical context the regulatory
framework clearly creates a niche for research, while in the financial
context research does not enjoy special privacy considerations. This
section examines the medical research privacy exceptions and outlines
22 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 16.
231d.
24 For example, if a bank allowed a researcher access to 1o,ooo mortgages the bank would
have to send a notice to each of the lO,OOO customers affected. At forty-four cents postage
per notification it would cost the bank $4,400 to send out the notices. The bank, which
already wants to keep the information proprietarily, likely would not want to incur this
cost, and the researcher may not have the funds to pay the cost.
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the different regulatory hurdles a researcher must go through to
complete his or her research, because these medical research
procedures could provide a template for developing financial research
procedures.
A. THE PRIVACY RULE AND RESEARCH: RESEARCH PROCEDURES
As technology advanced in the period leading up to the mid-
199o's, the ability of the medical profession to digitally collect and
more efficiently manage patient records dramatically improved.25
These increased abilities created greater privacy concerns for sensitive
patient medical records.26 Responding to these concerns, Congress
enacted the HIPAA in 1996.27 Congress granted the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") the right to "promulgate final
regulations containing standards [governing privacy of individually
identifiable health information] not later than the date that is 42
months after the date of the enactment of this Act," so long as
Congress did not first legislate the standards within thirty-six months
of enacting HIPAA.28 When Congress failed to act, the Department of
Health and Human Services issued an initial "Privacy Rule" in 2000,
and updated the rule in 2002 to clarify ambiguous wording and
correct unintended administrative burdens.29
The Privacy Rule is designed to provide federal standards to
protect personally identifiable health information.3o Personally
identifiable health information is classified by the following:
(i) Is created or received by a health care provider,
health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse;
and
25 Randolph C. Barrows Jr. & Paul D. Clayton, Privacy, Confidentiality, and Electronic
Medical Records, 3 J. AM. MED INFORMATICS ASS'N 139 (1996).
26 Id.
27 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936(2006).
28 Id. at § 264(c)(1).
29 Protecting Personal Health Information in Research: Understanding the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, National Institutes of Health, available at
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pro2.asp (Last visited April 8, 2010).
30 id.
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(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual; the
provision of health care to an individual; or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of health
care to an individual; and
(i) That identifies the individual; or
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe the information can be used to identify the
individual. 31
A subset and more heavily regulated type of personal information
is protected health information ("PHI"). PHI includes only the
personally identifiable health information that has been transmitted
electronically, maintained electronically, or transmitted or maintained
by any other medium.32 As a general rule, PHI may only be disclosed
or released by the express authorization of the patient.33 HHS has
enacted regulatory "core elements," which every authorization must
include, and these elements must be in plain language.34
In general, patient notice and consent must be obtained before
PHI may be disclosed, but there are specific circumstances where PHI
may be disclosed without a waiver. It may be impractical for
researchers conducting certain types of research to obtain consent
from every patient involved. In these circumstances the researcher
may submit a proposed project to an Institutional Review Board
("IRB").35 An IRB is a committee designated by an institution to
review proposed research on human subjects.36 The IRB is the
institutional gatekeeper that must balance the need for research with
the privacy of the patients. The IRB is the institutional gatekeeper
3145 C.F.R. § 16o.103 (2009).
32 Id.
33 45 C.F.R. § 164.5o8(a)(1) (2009).
34 Id. at § 164.5o8(c)(1), (3).
35 Institutional Review Boards and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, available at
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/IRB-Factsheet.pdf.
36 Id.
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that must balance the need for research with the privacy of the
patients. Before research is approved, HIPAA regulations require the
IRB to determine that numerous requirements have been met.37
Specifically, the IRB must determine that there are proper safeguards
for protecting PHI and that the research would not be possible
without the PHI.38 A complete waiver is granted when locating the
patients and gaining their consent would be impractical.39 A partial
waiver is granted when a researcher needs PHI for one specific aspect
of research, for example to locate possible subjects.40 Once the waiver
is granted, the covered entity may then disclose the PHI to the
researcher.
B. EFFECTS OF THE ACT
Medical researchers have attacked the HIPAA Privacy Rule as an
unnecessary measure that impedes research. One critique is that the
rule is rather complicated, and therefore research institutions have to
devote large amounts of time and resources to ensure they are within
the guidelines.41 For example, one recent study conducted by Dr.
Robert Ness questioned 1,527 epidemiologists about the effect HIPAA
was having on their research.42 Roughly sixty-eight percent of the
respondents claimed the Privacy Rule made research harder, and forty
percent indicated that the Privacy Rule made research more
expensive.43 Additionally, half of the respondents claimed the Privacy
37 See NIH Pub. No. 03-5448, Privacy Boards and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Sep. 2003) available at
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/privacy-boards-hipaaprivacy-ule.pdf.
38 Id. at3.
39 45 C.F.R. § 16 4 .5 12(i). See NIH Pub. No. 03-5448, Privacy Boards and the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES (SEP. 2003), 3 available at
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/privacyboards-hipaa-privacy-rule.pdf.
40 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i).
41 Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, The New HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of1996) Medical Privacy Rule, 1o8 CIRCULATION: J. OF THE AM. HEART
ASS'N 912, 914 (2003).
42 Robert Ness, Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Health Research, 298 JAMA
2164-70 (2007), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/298/18/2164.
43 Id. at 2166.
564 [Vol. 5:3
WILLIAMS
Rule added to the time needed to complete research.44 Perhaps the
most alarming finding was that only twenty-five percent of the
respondents felt the Privacy Rule had enhanced patient privacy.45
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The most obvious policy option for expanding research data would
be to expand the information collected under the HMDA. This would
make a broad range of data available to all researchers and the public
at large. Lending institutions already collect and send copious
amounts of data, and the institutions have collected more data than
they disclose. Further, the institutions already are familiar with
redacting and protecting personal information, and therefore the
misuse of personal financial data would be unlikely.
While expanding the range of data collected under the HMDA
would expand the information available to researchers, there is an
implicit line that needs to be respected as expanding data collection
would give the government large amounts of personal financial
information, creating data security concerns. Additionally, the data
collected under the HMDA cannot possibly suit every researcher's
goals. Different researchers will inevitably want to gather information
that is either different or independent of the HMDA data. Therefore,
while expanding the data collection powers of the HMDA will be
beneficial, it alone is not sufficient to expand financial research.
To complement the expansion of the data collected under the
HMDA, I would propose creating a research exception to the GLB Act,
modeled after the research exception in HIPAA. HIPAA attempts to
balance the need for research with the need for privacy. However,
medical researchers have lamented that the balance is uneven and has
adversely affected their research. Building on this criticism and
learning from it, the financial privacy exception could implement
some aspects of HIPAA while still maintaining efficient research.
Congress should enact federal regulations that financial
researchers would have to abide by, essentially making the researchers
accountable in the event that they misuse financial data. This would
include making researchers become certified or trained to understand
the importance of financial privacy. Secondly, institutions would
disclose in their privacy notices that information could be released to
third party researchers who agree to abide by the federal regulations
44Id.
45 Id.
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or have been certified. Then the "accredited" researcher would submit
his research proposal to the institution. Having determined the
researcher is accredited the financial institution could release the
information. Finally, any information that is released would have to
be sufficiently redacted to ensure the data could not be traced back to
the customer.
This policy suggestion assumes that financial institutions will give
their financial data to a researcher. The medical research exception in
HIPAA exists because covered entities wanted the exception to allow
researchers to develop new medical technologies. The exception
benefits the entities and the researchers; however, that is not the case
with financial institutions. The goals of the researchers may diverge
from the goals of the financial institutions. Most institutions have
their own in-house research departments, and academic research is
not likely to benefit those institutions. A research exception might
exist, but would be useless if institutions do not want to disclose the
data. Therefore, regulations would need to provide a minimum
amount of information that financial institutions would be required to
disclose in order to allow proper research.
Also, in the medical context there already was cooperation
between researchers and entities. The HIPAA Privacy Rules added
complexity to an already existing relationship. One benefit of a
financial privacy exception is that a privacy research exception cannot
impede and frustrate researchers, because there was no relationship
to begin with.
In order for the exception to operate, institutions will have to
disclose data. This could be accomplished through regulations.
Congress could use the leverage created by the recent financial crisis
and bailouts to implement requirements that financial institutions
release data to certain researchers. The regulations could require
institutions to release information only to not-for-profit researchers,
or only to certified researchers. Further, the regulations could limit
the range of data the researchers can ask for to avoid bogging the
institution down with limitless requests.
Perhaps instead of creating a research exception in the GLB Act,
researchers could go through the office that compiles the HMDA data,
and ask them to collect more specific data from certain institutions.
The office could evaluate the merits of the research and the risks to
financial privacy, and then decide whether to collect the data or deny
the request. In a sense, the office would be acting as an IRB through
which financial research could be conducted and monitored to ensure
privacy compliance.
A final policy suggestion is to create a standard contract with
which researchers could enter into agreements with institutions. If
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the government was to approve a standard contract that provides for
data security and financial privacy, researchers could enter an
agreement, gather data, and, in the event of the misuse of data, be
contractually liable to the financial institution or customers.
All of these policy suggestions attempt to expand research while at
the same time limiting the potential for financial privacy misuse. In
limiting the financial privacy misuse possibilities, it is important not
to over-regulate, making research needlessly complicated and time
consuming.

